Conspicuous Consumption, Economic Growth, and Taxation: A Generalization by Fisher, Walter H. & Hof, Franz X.
IHS Economics Series
Working Paper 77
March 2000
Conspicuous Consumption, 
Economic Growth, and Taxation: A 
Generalization
Walter H. Fisher
Franz X. Hof
Impressum
Author(s):
Walter H. Fisher, Franz X. Hof
Title:
Conspicuous Consumption, Economic Growth, and Taxation: A Generalization
ISSN: Unspecified 
2000 Institut für Höhere Studien - Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS)
Josefstädter Straße 39, A-1080 Wien
E-Mail:  o ce@ihs.ac.atﬃ  
Web: ww   w .ihs.ac.  a  t 
All IHS Working Papers are available online: http://irihs.  ihs.  ac.at/view/ihs_series/   
This paper is available for download without charge at: http://irihs.ihs.ac.at/1248/
Conspicuous Consumption, Economic Growth, and
Taxation: A Generalization
Walter H. FISHER¤ Franz X. HOF y
October 1999
Abstract
This paper studies the in‡uence of consumption externalities in the Ram-
sey model. In contrast to the recent literature, a quite general speci…cation of
preferences is used and the concept of the e¤ective intertemporal elasticity of
substitution is introduced. We give conditions for the observational equiva-
lence between economies with consumption externalities and externality-free
economies. An additional key result is that there exist several types of instan-
taneous utility functions in which the decentralized solution coincides with
the socially planned one in spite of the presence of consumption externalities.
The conditions for optimal taxation are also derived.
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1. Introduction
The goal of this paper is to generalize and extend the results of a paper recently
published in this Journal by Rauscher (1997b), (henceforth Rauscher). Rauscher
introduces consumption externalities into an otherwise standard Ramsey model
and analyzes the e¤ects of this modi…cation on economic growth and the issue
of optimal taxation. He assumes that the instantaneous utility of individuals
depends not only on absolute consumption, as in the standard model, but also on
relative consumption. This speci…cation expresses two ideas: i) economic agents
care about their relative position in society, and ii) social status is determined by
relative consumption.1
It is usual in this literature to restrict attention to a particular speci…cation
of preferences. Rauscher, for instance, assumed that the instantaneous utility is
additively separable in own and relative consumption, where its dependence on
own consumption is captured by an isoelastic function, while Gali (1994) and
Harbaugh (1996) consider other functional forms.2 In this paper we will gener-
alize and extend Rauscher’s results by using speci…cations of preferences that
encompass those employed by these authors. We will, however, follow Rauscher
in assuming that agents are identical, in specifying that there is a single consump-
tion good, in neglecting both population growth and the depreciation of physical
capital, and in treating labor supply as exogenously given.
Section 2 sets out the model and derives the decentralized solution. We introduce
consumption externalities by assuming that preferences depend on the average
level of consumption as well as on individual consumption. This approach not
only encompasses the relative consumption case in which the utility function can
be written as a function of absolute and relative consumption, but also permits
alternative interpretations of consumption externalities. We solve the optimizing
problem of the representative agent in which individuals take the average level
of consumption as given. We then derive the symmetric, decentralized equilib-
rium and introduce the concept of the decentralized economy’s “e¤ective” in-
tertemporal elasticity of substitution. This concept makes it possible to present
the decentralized solution in such a way that immediate comparisons with the
standard Ramsey model can be made. Proposition 1 then shows that an economy
with consumption externalities is observationally equivalent to an externality-free
1An alternative branch of this literature models status as determined by relative wealth rather
than by relative consumption. This relative wealth approach is employed, for instance, by Corneo
and Jeanne (1997), Rauscher (1997a), and Futagami and Shibata (1998).
2Gali (1994) uses portfolio and asset pricing models, while Harbaugh (1996) employs a sto-
chastic two-period consumption and savings framework.
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economy with a “standard” elasticity of substitution if the e¤ective intertempo-
ral elasticity of substitution equals the standard one. This observational equiva-
lence property implies that usual results for neoclassical and endogenous growth
economies remain valid despite the introduction of consumption externalities.
The only modi…cation to be made in the usual results is to replace the stan-
dard intertemporal elasticity of substitution with the e¤ective one. For instance,
proposition 2 shows that if the production function satis…es the usual neoclassical
assumptions, then the steady state values of capital and consumption do not de-
pend on the speci…cation of the instantaneous utility function, as in the standard
model. Consumption externalities a¤ect only the speed of adjustment through
the e¤ective intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Proposition 3 then states
necessary conditions for endogenous growth, which involve the properties of both
the production function and the e¤ective intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
We will also give an illustration in which the relationship between the e¤ective
intertemporal elasticity of substitution and the “degree of status-consciousness”
is ambiguous, which implies that the relationship between the rate of growth and
the degree of status-consciousness is also ambiguous.
In section 3 we will derive the social planner’s solution in order to determine
whether consumption externalities create distortions in the decentralized econ-
omy. Similarly to section 2, we will introduce the concept of the socially planned
economy’s “e¤ective” intertemporal elasticity of substitution. This will enable us
to easily make comparisons between the social and the decentralized solutions.
The key result of this section is that there are several quite general types of the
instantaneous utility function in which the corresponding decentralized solution
coincides with the socially optimal solution in spite of the presence of consump-
tion externalities. According to proposition 4, all utility functions of these types
are characterized by the property that the decentralized economy’s e¤ective in-
tertemporal elasticity of substitution equals that of the socially planned economy.
If this condition is violated, then consumption externalities create distortions in
the decentralized equilibrium. In this case the government might try to induce the
private sector to attain the social optimum by designing an optimal tax policy.
The issue of optimal taxation is dealt with in section 4. Following Rauscher, we
consider both a capital tax and a consumption tax and assume that tax revenues
are fully rebated as lump-sum transfers. A consumption tax policy in which the
tax rate is constant over time will not a¤ect the time paths of consumption and
capital. On the other hand, capital taxation in‡uences consumption and capital
formation even if the tax rate is constant. Proposition 6 states the necessary and
su¢cient conditions for optimal taxation. If the decentralized economy’s e¤ective
intertemporal elasticity of substitution is less than that of the socially planned
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economy, then the e¤ective preference for smoothing consumption over time is
too strong. Consequently, too much consumption is shifted from the future to
the present. This misallocation can be avoided either by subsidizing capital or by
taxing consumption in such a way that the tax rate falls over time. Both policy
measures lower the price of future consumption in terms of present consump-
tion. On the other hand, if the decentralized economy’s e¤ective intertemporal
elasticity of substitution exceeds that of the socially planned economy, then the
e¤ective willingness to postpone consumption is too high. Consequently, too much
consumption is shifted from the present to the future. In this situation the govern-
ment must raise the price of future consumption in terms of present consumption
by either taxing capital or by taxing consumption in such a way that the tax rate
increases over time. These results will be illustrated by two speci…c examples.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 5 contains some brief con-
cluding remarks and the paper closes with an mathematical appendix in which
the most important proofs and derivations are given.
2. The Model and the Decentralized Solution
We begin by assuming that the economy is populated by a very large number
of identical, in…nitely-lived individuals. For simplicity, we specify that the pop-
ulation size remains constant over time. As is common practice in the Ramsey
model, we restrict attention to the case of perfect foresight. The representative
individual wishes to maximize discounted intertemporal utility as represented byR1
0 e
¡rtU (c (t) ; C (t))dt, where r is the rate of time preference (which is assumed
to be constant) and where U denotes the instantaneous utility function. Follow-
ing Gali (1994) and Harbaugh (1996), we assume that the instantaneous utility
of the representative individual depends not only on own consumption, c, but
also on the average consumption in the economy, C. This speci…cation of U al-
lows to introduce consumption externalities into the standard Ramsey model in
a simple but still quite general way. A special case arises if U takes the form
U (c;C) = V (c; z), where z ´ c=C. This speci…cation assumes that instantaneous
utility depends both on absolute consumption, c, and relative consumption, z
(´ c=C), where the latter determines the individual’s status in the society.3 We
will subsequently refer to this as the “relative consumption case”.
Gali (1994), Harbaugh (1996), and Rauscher use the simplifying assumption that
the instantaneous utility functions U and V take particular functional forms. The
3 In contrast to Frank (1985), we do not distinguish between positional and non-positional
goods in determining status.
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speci…cations used by Gali and Harbaugh will be described below, [see (20)]. In
Rauscher the following additively separable preferences are assumed:4
V (c; z) =
1
1 ¡ 1=¯
³
c1¡1=¯ ¡ 1
´
+ s (z) ; ¯ > 0; s0 > 0; s00 < 0: (1)
One of the main objectives of Rauscher’s paper is to compare economies in which
conspicuous consumption plays a role to economies without status competition,
[see propositions 1, 2, and 3 in Rauscher]. In this context he considers externality-
free economies in which the standard instantaneous utility function u (c) equals
u (c) = (1 ¡ 1=¯)¡1
³
c1¡1=¯ ¡ 1
´
. In contrast, we will consider quite general spec-
i…cations of U (resp. V ) and u. This will make it possible to both generalize
existing results and to derive new insights into the role of consumption externali-
ties. Nevertheless, in order to ensure that the individual’s optimization problem is
well-behaved, we must impose several restrictions on preferences. First, we assume
that U exhibits positive and diminishing marginal utility of own consumption c:
Uc (c; C) > 0; Ucc (c;C) < 0: (2)
In terms of the marginal utility of average consumption we allow for both UC < 0,
“negative spillovers”, and UC > 0, “positive spillovers”. In the latter case we can
think of private consumption as possessing some public good features. The second
order partial derivative UcC may be of either sign.5 In a symmetric equilibrium in
which identical individuals choose identical consumption levels, the instantaneous
utility of each individual is given by ~U (c) ´ U (c; c). We assume further that ~U (c)
is increasing in c and strictly concave:
~U 0 (c) = Uc (c; c) + UC (c; c) > 0; (3)
~U 00 (c) = Ucc (c; c) + 2UcC (c; c) + UCC (c; c) < 0: (4)
Condition (3), ~U 0 (c) > 0, ensures that the instantaneous utility of each individual
rises if the economy moves from one symmetric situation to another in which each
individual has a higher consumption level. Condition (4) implies that the marginal
utility ~U 0 (c) diminishes as c increases. Obviously, (3) is never violated in the case
of positive spillovers, UC > 0. If, however, UC < 0, (3) requires the negative
spillover e¤ect caused by the increase in average consumption to be more than
o¤set by the positive e¤ect resulting from the rise in own consumption. With
4 In Rauscher the paramter ¯ is replaced by ¾. We will use ¾ below to denote general expres-
sions for the elasticity of substitution.
5For a discussion of the role of UcC at the individual level, see Hof (1999a).
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respect to the relative consumption case, the corresponding curvature conditions
on V are
Vc (c; z) > 0; Vcc (c; z) < 0; Vz (c; z) > 0; (5)
Vcc (c; z) + 2c
¡1zVcz (c; z) + c¡2z2Vzz (c; z) < 0: (6)
Condition (5) implies that the marginal utility of V with respect to both absolute
consumption c and relative consumption z is positive. In addition, the marginal
utility of absolute consumption decreases as c increases. Assumption (6) corre-
sponds to the relative consumption version of (4).
Turning to the ‡ow budget constraint of the representative consumer-producer, we
follow Rauscher in assuming that physical capital does not depreciate. Abstracting
from a public sector, the ‡ow budget constraint equals
_k = f (k) ¡ c; (7)
where k and f (k) denote the representative individual’s capital stock and ‡ow
of output, respectively. We assume that the production function f exhibits the
following standard properties: f 0 (k) > 0, f 00 (k) · 0, f (0) = 0, and f (k) ! 1
as k ! 1. We will discuss below the properties required for endogenous growth.
The representative individual chooses c (t) to maximize discounted intertemporal
utility, given by
R1
0 e
¡rtU (c (t) ; C (t))dt, subject to the ‡ow budget constraint
(7), and the initial condition k (0) = k0 > 0. A crucial feature of this optimization
problem is that the representative individual takes C (t) as given when choosing
c (t). In other words, each individual is small enough to neglect his own contribu-
tion to the average consumption level in the economy. We solve the optimization
problem by applying optimal control theory.6 The current-value Hamiltonian is
given by H = U (c;C) + ¸ [f (k) ¡ c], where the costate variable ¸ denotes the
current shadow price of capital. The necessary optimality conditions, Hc = 0 and
_¸ = r¸ ¡ Hk, can be written as
Uc (c;C) ¡ ¸ = 0; (8)
_¸ = ¡¸ ¢ £f 0 (k) ¡ r¤ ; (9)
with the transversality condition given by
lim
t!1 e
¡rt¸k = 0: (10)
6Following Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), we will restrict our attention to cases in which
attainable utility is bounded and both consumption and capital are strictly positive along the
optimal paths.
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The assumptions made so far ensure that if (c (t) ; k (t)) satis…es the transversality
condition (10) – in addition to the ‡ow budget constraint (7), the initial condition
k (0) = k0, the necessary optimality conditions (8) and (9) – then it is an optimal
path (a proof is available from the authors on request).
In a symmetric macroeconomic equilibrium identical individuals make identical
choices, so that c = C and z ´ c=C = 1. It will be useful to present this (sym-
metric) decentralized solution in such a way that comparisons with the standard
Ramsey model can be made at a glance. Recall that in the standard model over-
all utility of the representative consumer-producer is given by
R1
0 e
¡rtu (c (t)) dt,
where u (c) is the standard instantaneous utility function with u0 > 0, u00 < 0. It is
well known that in the absence of any government intervention the dynamic evo-
lution of c and k is governed by the capital accumulation equation, _k = f (k)¡ c,
and the usual Euler equation
_c
c
= ¾ (c)
£
f 0 (k) ¡ r¤ ; ¾ (c) ´ ¡ u0 (c)
cu00 (c)
; (11)
where ¾ (c) denotes the standard intertemporal elasticity of substitution. The ini-
tial condition on the capital stock is k (0) = k0, while the transversality condition
can be written as
lim
t!1
½
k (t) ¢ exp
·
¡
Z t
0
f 0 (k (v)) dv
¸¾
= 0: (12)
The decentralized solution of the model with consumption externalities can be
represented analogously.7 While the capital accumulation equation, the initial
condition, and the transversality condition are identical to their standard versions,
the standard Euler equation is replaced with
_c
c
= ¾ed (c)
£
f 0 (k) ¡ r¤ ; (13)
where
¾ed (c) ´ ¡ Uc (c; c)
c [Ucc (c; c) + UcC (c; c)]
(14)
is the decentralized economy’s e¤ective intertemporal elasticity of substitution
(the superscripts e and d stand for “e¤ective” and “decentralized”, respectively).
In the relative consumption case, in which U(c; C) = V (c; c=C), (14) becomes
¾ed (c) = ¡ Vc (c; 1) + c
¡1Vz (c; 1)
c [Vcc (c; 1) + c¡1Vcz (c; 1) ¡ c¡2Vz (c; 1)] : (15)
7For a proof of the following results see the appendix, subsection C, in which symmetric
macroeconomic equilibria with taxes and transfers are analyzed. The results for the decentralized
economy without a public sector are simply obtained by setting taxes and transfers to zero.
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In the following we will assume that
Ucc (c; c) + UcC (c; c) < 0; (16)
in order to guarantee that ¾ed (c) > 0. In the relative consumption case (16)
becomes
Vcc (c; 1) + c
¡1Vcz (c; 1) ¡ c¡2Vz (c; 1) < 0: (17)
A detailed economic interpretation of (16) is given in Hof (1999a). Loosely speak-
ing, this condition ensures that individuals do not “overreact” to changes in av-
erage consumption and that equilibrium consumption still depends negatively
on ¸, as in the standard model. With these results, we can state the following
proposition.
Proposition 1. (Observational equivalence): Consider two decentralized
economies – abstracting from a public sector – which di¤er only with respect to
the instantaneous utility function. Assume that one of these economies exhibits
consumption externalities so that the instantaneous utility function of the repre-
sentative agent is given by U (c; C), while the other economy is externality-free so
that the instantaneous utility function can be written as u (c). Let decentralized
solutions exist for both economies.
(a) If ¾ed (c) = ¾ (c), then the two economies are observationally equivalent in
the sense that their decentralized solutions are identical.
(b) ¾ed (c) = ¾ (c) holds if the instantaneous utility functions U (c; C) and u (c)
satisfy the condition that
u0 (c) = Â ¢ Uc (c; c) ; (18)
where Â is an arbitrary positive constant. In the relative consumption case
this condition is written as
u0 (c) = Â ¢
h
Vc (c; 1) + c
¡1Vz (c; 1)
i
: (19)
The proof of part a is obvious from the results described above, since both
economies have the same initial condition, k (0) = k0, the same transversality
condition, (12), and the same capital accumulation equation, _k = f (k)¡c. Hence,
their decentralized solutions are identical if and only if their Euler equations are
identical. From (11) and (13), it follows that this is the case if ¾ed (c) = ¾ (c). For
the proof of part b see the appendix, subsection A.
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We will next provide two illustrations of the property of observational equiva-
lence. First, if the utility function V (c; z) takes the form used by Rauscher, then
Vc(c; 1) = c
¡1=¯ and Vz(c; 1) = s0(1). Substituting these expressions into (19), we
obtain u0(c) = Â
h
c¡1=¯ + c¡1s0(1)
i
. Integration of this condition with respect to
c yields that the economy with consumption externalities studied by Rauscher is
observationally equivalent to any externality-free economy in which the instanta-
neous utility function takes the form
u(c) =
Â
1 ¡ 1=¯
³
c1¡1=¯ ¡ 1
´
+ Âs0(1) ln c + ·; Â > 0;
where · is an arbitrary constant. Next, we let preferences assume a functional form
that encompasses the speci…cations used by Harbaugh (1996) and Gali (1994):8
U (c; C) =
1
1 ¡ ®
¡
cC¡°
¢1¡®
; ® > 0; ° < 1; ° + ® (1 ¡ °) > 0: (20)
By substituting Uc (c; c) = c¡°¡®(1¡°) into (18) and integrating the resulting ex-
pression with respect to c, we obtain the following externality-free utility function
that is equivalent to the Harbaugh-Gali type:
u (c) =
Â
1 ¡ µ
³
c1¡µ ¡ 1
´
+ ·; µ = ° + ® (1 ¡ °) ; Â > 0:
The property of observational equivalence implies that some of the standard re-
sults of the Ramsey model can be readily applied to the modi…ed model with
consumption externalities. We state here two propositions that describe the prop-
erties of the dynamic equilibria in the neoclassical and endogenous growth cases,
(the proofs are available from the authors on request).
Proposition 2. If the production function satis…es the conditions
f 00 < 0 and lim
k!1
f 0 (k) < r < lim
k!0
f 0 (k) ;
then the decentralized solution exhibits the following properties:
8Technically, we should write (20) as U (c; C) = (1¡ ®)¡1
h¡
cC¡°
¢1¡® ¡ 1i in order to
include the (logarithmic) case in which ® = 1. There are negative (resp. positive) consumption
spillovers if ° is positive (resp. negative). Harbaugh’s speci…cation, which rules out positive
consumption spillovers, is obtained with 0 < ° < 1. Gali’s speci…cation takes the form U (c; C) =
(1¡ ®)¡1 c1¡®C´®, with ® > 0 and ´ < 1. This functional form is recovered from (20) by setting
° = ¡ (1¡ ®)¡1 ´®. In the context of our model we must impose an additional restriction, namely
(1¡ ®)¡1 ´® > ¡1, in order to ensure that ° < 1 holds as required by (20).
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(a) The economy does not generate endogenous, steady state growth. The
steady state (k¤; c¤), uniquely determined by c¤ = f (k¤) and f 0 (k¤) = r, is
a saddlepoint, with the corresponding stable arm satisfying the transversal-
ity condition. The speci…cation of the instantaneous utility function U only
in‡uences the transitional dynamics but not the steady state (k¤; c¤).
(b) In the neighborhood of the steady state, the optimal paths of k and c can
be approximated by
k (t) = k¤ + (k0 ¡ k¤) e¹1t; c (t) = c¤ + (k0 ¡ k¤)¹2e¹1t;
where ¹1 < 0 and ¹2 > 0 denote the roots of the characteristic polynomial
such that ¹1 + ¹2 = r and ¹1¹2 = c
¤¾ed (c¤) f 00 (k¤) < 0. The di¤erence
(k (t) ¡ k¤) declines at the rate j¹1j, which, in turn, depends positively on
¾ed (c¤). The stable arm, c = c¤ + ¹2 (k ¡ k¤), is positively sloped in the
(k; c) plane, where its slope, given by ¹2, increases with ¾
ed (c¤).
Part a of our proposition 2 shows that Rauscher’s proposition 1, (which says
that if the production function f (k) satis…es the standard neoclassical proper-
ties, then conspicuous consumption does not a¤ect the long-run steady state),
is robust with respect to the speci…cation of the instantaneous utility function
V . The main message of part b is that the higher is the e¤ective intertemporal
elasticity of substitution, the lower is the level of consumption at t = 0, while the
higher is the speed of convergence towards the steady state. The next proposition
states necessary conditions for the occurrence of long-run endogenous growth and
describes how it depends on the e¤ective intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
Proposition 3. Let the decentralized solution exist and assume that it exhibits
endogenous steady-state growth in the sense that limt!1
³
_k (t) =k (t)
´
> 0 and
limt!1 (c (t) =k (t)) > 0. It is then the case that
lim
c!1¾
ed (c) > 0; (21)
·
1 ¡ 1
limc!1 ¾ed (c)
¸
lim
k!1
f 0 (k) < r < lim
k!1
f 0 (k) (22)
holds and that the transversality condition (12) is satis…ed. Moreover, it is true
that
lim
t!1
Ã
_k (t)
k (t)
!
= lim
t!1
µ
_c (t)
c (t)
¶
= lim
c!1¾
ed (c) ¢
·
lim
k!1
f 0 (k) ¡ r
¸
: (23)
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The case of endogenous growth will be illustrated by considering the model in
which the instantaneous utility function is of the generalized Harbaugh-Gali type
given in (20), and the production function is of the AK -type, i.e., f (k) = ak. We
also assume that a (1 ¡ ®) (1 ¡ °) < r < a holds. Since the e¤ective intertemporal
elasticity of substitution ¾ed (c) in this case is given by
¾ed (c) =
1
° + ® (1 ¡ °) > 0; (24)
it is easily veri…ed that the conditions (21) and (22) in proposition 3 are satis…ed.
The decentralized solution also exhibits the property that the growth rates of c
and k are constant over time and equal to:
_k
k
=
_c
c
=
a ¡ r
° + (1 ¡ °)®: (25)
In addition, the transversality condition holds if and only if the initial level of
consumption, c (0), is chosen according to:
c (0) =
·
r ¡ a (1 ¡ ®) (1 ¡ °)
° + (1 ¡ °)®
¸
k0 > 0: (26)
Di¤erentiating the right-hand sides of (24), (25), and (26) with respect to °,
we obtain the following results. If ® > 1, then both ¾ed (c) and the common
growth rate of c and k depend positively on °, while the initial level of con-
sumption, c (0), depends negatively upon °. If ® < 1, then the opposite results
hold. If we follow Harbaugh in restricting attention to 0 < ° < 1, then (20)
is compatible with a relative consumption interpretation since we can rewrite
(20) as U (c;C) = V (c; c=C) with V (c; z) ´ (1 ¡ ®)¡1 ¡c1¡°z°¢1¡®. The para-
meter ° can be interpreted as measure of the “degree of status-consciousness”.
The case in which ° = 0 corresponds to a situation in which status does not
matter at all, while ° ! 1 describes the limiting case in which status as mea-
sured by relative consumption is the only thing the consumer values. Thus, our
results imply that if the instantaneous utility function is of the Harbaugh type,
then the relationship between the decentralized growth rate and the degree of
status-consciousness is ambiguous. A similar ambiguity is described by Rauscher
in his proposition 2. He compares a status-seeking society in which V (c; z) takes
the form given by (1) to a society without status-seeking behavior in which u (c)
equals u (c) = (1 ¡ 1=¯)¡1
³
c1¡1=¯ ¡ 1
´
and …nds that if the production function
is of the AK -type, then an economy which is populated by status-seeking agents
grows faster (resp. slower) if ¯ is less (resp. greater) than unity.
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Proposition 3 of our paper can be further used to illustrate that Rauscher’s propo-
sition 3 – “Along an endogenous growth path, the long-term growth rate of an
economy with status competition will not be less than that of an economy with-
out status competition.” – is not robust with respect to the speci…cation of the
preferences. From (23) and its analogue for the externality-free economy, (which
is simply obtained by replacing ¾ed (c) by ¾ (c)), it follows that the long-term
growth rate of an economy with consumption externalities will not be less than
that of an externality-free economy if and only if limc!1 ¾ed (c) ¸ limc!1 ¾ (c).
3. The Social Planner’s Solution
From a normative point of view the relevant question is not whether economies
with consumption spillovers grow fast or slowly, but whether they grow too fast
or too slowly compared to the socially optimal growth rate. To see whether the
existence of consumption spillovers leads to social nonoptimality, we follow the
usual practice of comparing the decentralized solution to the results from a social
planner’s problem. Suppose that there exists a benevolent social planner who
dictates the choices of consumption over time and who seeks to maximize the
welfare of the representative individual. Since individuals are identical, we assume
that the social planner assigns the same consumption level to each agent so that
c = C holds. Consequently, the instantaneous utility of each individual is given by
~U (c) ´ U (c; c). The social planner’s optimization problem is then to choose c (t)
so as to maximize
R1
0 e
¡rt ~U (c)dt, subject to the economy’s resource constraint,
_k = f (k) ¡ c, and the initial condition k (0) = k0. The necessary optimality
conditions are given by
~U 0 (c) = Uc (c; c) + UC (c; c) = ¸ (27)
and _¸ = ¡¸ ¢ [f 0 (k) ¡ r], where the latter condition is identical to (9). The
transversality condition is given by (10). Using (27) and _¸ = ¡¸ ¢ [f 0 (k) ¡ r], we
obtain the following Euler equation for consumption
_c
c
= ¾es (c)
£
f 0 (k) ¡ r¤ ; (28)
where
¾es (c) = ¡
~U 0 (c)
c ~U 00 (c)
= ¡ Uc (c; c) + UC (c; c)
c [Ucc (c; c) + 2UcC (c; c) + UCC (c; c)]
> 0 (29)
will be called the socially planned economy’s e¤ective intertemporal elasticity of
substitution (the superscript “s” stands for “social”). From the conditions (3)
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and (4), it follows that ¾es (c) > 0. In the relative consumption case equation
(29) simpli…es to
¾es (c) = ¡ Vc (c; 1)
cVcc (c; 1)
> 0: (30)
The capital accumulation equation, the initial condition, and the transversality
condition are identical to the versions that apply to the decentralized economy,
i.e., they are given by _k = f (k)¡ c, k (0) = k0, and (12). The Euler equations for
consumption for the decentralized and socially planned economies, (13) and (28),
respectively, are identical if and only if the e¤ective intertemporal elasticities of
substitution, ¾ed (c) and ¾es (c), are also identical. This leads immediately to the
proposition 4.
Proposition 4. (Social optimality of the decentralized solution)
(a) Assume that both the decentralized solution and the socially planned so-
lution exist. If the corresponding e¤ective intertemporal elasticities of sub-
stitution coincide, i.e., ¾ed (c) = ¾es (c), then the decentralized solution
coincides with the socially planned solution in spite of the existence of con-
sumption spillovers.9
(b) The condition ¾ed (c) = ¾es (c) is equivalent to
jUC (c; c)j
Uc (c; c)
= ±; (31)
where ± is an arbitrary positive constant. If there are negative spillovers,
then assumption (3) requires that 0 < ± < 1.
(c) In the relative consumption case the condition ¾ed (c) = ¾es (c) is equivalent
to
Vz (c; 1)
cVc (c; 1)
= ´; (32)
where ´ is an arbitrary positive constant.
9 If ¾ed (c) = ¾es (c), then the decentralized solution and the socially planned solution will
have the same rate of growth in the shadow price of capital, _¸ (t) =¸ (t). The time paths of ¸ (t)
will, however, deviate. If there are negative consumption externalities, then the shadow price of
capital in the decentralized economy exceeds that of the socially planned economy at any time
t. If there are positive consumption externalities, then the opposite is the case.
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Part a is evident from the considerations indicated above. For the remainder of
proposition 4, see the proof in the appendix, subsection B. The conditions given
in part b of proposition 4 can be interpreted graphically. If the iso-utility curves,
U (c;C) = constant, are plotted in the (C; c) plane, then their slope is given by
¡UC (c; C) =Uc (c;C). Obviously, the iso-utility curves are positively (resp. nega-
tively) sloped in the presence of negative (resp. positive) consumption spillovers.
From part b of proposition 4 follows that ¾ed (c) = ¾es (c) holds for all c if and
only if the slope of the iso-utility curves is constant along the 45 degree line.
Moreover, condition (3) requires that this constant slope be less than unity in the
presence of negative spillovers.
The next proposition shows that if the decentralized solution is socially optimal,
then this property is robust with respect to transformations of the underlying
instantaneous utility function.
Proposition 5. (Transformations and social optimality): Let G (¢) denote
a transformation function and assume that the decentralized solutions correspond-
ing to U (c;C) and G [U (c;C)] exist.
(a) If U (c;C) satis…es the conditions (2), (3), (4), and (16), then the property
that the transformation G is strictly increasing and concave, G0 > 0 and
G00 · 0, is also su¢cient for G [U (c; C)] to satisfy these four conditions.
(b) Assume that G0 > 0 and G00 · 0. If the decentralized solution corresponding
to U (c;C) is socially optimal, then the decentralized solution corresponding
to G [U (c;C)] is socially optimal as well.
The proof of proposition 5 is available on request from the authors. We will
next show, by giving six examples, that there exist several speci…cations of the
instantaneous utility function in which the decentralized solution coincides with
the socially planned solution.10
Example 1: If U (c; C) = V (c; c=C) and V takes the form used by Rauscher,
equation (1), then Vz (c; 1) = [cVc (c; 1)] = s0 (1) =c1¡1=¯ > 0. The condition for
social optimality given in part c of proposition 4, (32), requires that the right
hand side of this equation is independent of c. Obviously, this is ful…lled if and
only if ¯ = 1 which implies that ¾es (c) = ¾ed (c) = 1.
10Hof (1999b) has shown, however, that if labor supply is endogenously determined, then
the decentralized solution always departs from its Pareto optimal counterpart in the relative
consumption case.
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Example 2: If U (c;C) is of the generalized Harbaugh-Gali type, equation (20),
then jUC (c; c)j =Uc (c; c) = j°j. If there are negative consumption spillovers, i.e., if
° is positive, then j°j = °, where ° < 1 holds by assumption. Thus, the conditions
for social optimality given in part b of proposition 4 are satis…ed for all admissible
values of ® and °. Alternatively, we can show that ¾es (c) = ¾ed (c), where ¾ed (c)
is given by (24). This result implies that a decentralized economy with Harbaugh-
Gali preferences may either grow faster or more slowly, depending on the values
of ® and °, but that it will never grow too fast or too slowly.
The remaining four examples employ general types of preferences that can be rep-
resented as transformations of underlying additively separable or multiplicatively
separable utility functions with consumption externalities. For convenience, we
restrict our attention to transformation functions G that are strictly increasing
and concave.
Example 3 (General type I): Assume that U takes the form
U (c; C) = G (g (c) ¡ °g (C) + Â) ; ° < 1;
where ° and Â are constants. In order to ensure that U is well-behaved, i.e., that
U satis…es the conditions (2), (3), (4), and (16), we must introduce additional
restrictions on g. Su¢cient (but not necessary) restrictions are given by g0 > 0
and g00 < 0. Note that this speci…cation yields positive consumption spillovers if
and only if ° is negative. Since jUC (c; c)j =Uc (c; c) = j°j, where j°j is less than
unity in the case of negative consumption spillovers, the conditions for social
optimality given in part b of proposition 4 are satis…ed.
Example 4 (General type II): If U takes the form
U (c;C) = G
³
Â ¢ g (c) [g (C)]¡°
´
; ° < 1;
then the additional assumptions that Â > 0, ° > 0, g (x) > 0 for x > 0 , g0 > 0,
and g00 · 0 are su¢cient (but not necessary) for U to be well-behaved. It is
easily veri…ed that jUC (c; c)j =Uc (c; c) = j°j holds, where j°j is less than unity
in the case of negative consumption spillovers. Hence, the conditions for social
optimality given in part b of proposition 4 are satis…ed.
Example 5 (General type III): Assume that V takes the form
V (c; z) = G (Â + ° ln c + s (z)) ; ° > 0; s0 > 0;
where Â and ° are constants. In order to ensure that V is well-behaved, i.e., that
V satis…es the conditions (5), (6), and (17), we introduce an additional condition
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on s. A su¢cient (but not necessary) restriction is given by s00 · 0. The condition
for social optimality, (32), is satis…ed since Vz (c; 1) = [cVc (c; 1)] = °¡1s0 (1) > 0.
Example 6 (General type IV): If V takes the form
V (c; z) = G (Âc°s (z)) ; ° > 0; s (z) > 0; s0 > 0;
where Â and ° are constants, the following additional restrictions are su¢cient
(but not necessary) for V to be well-behaved: Â > 0, ° · 1 (with strict in-
equality if G00 = 0 holds), s00 · 0, and (1 ¡ °)°s (z) ¡ 2°zs0 (z) ¡ z2s00 (z) > 0.
The condition for social optimality, (32), is satis…ed since Vz (c; 1) = [cVc (c; 1)] =
°¡1s0 (1) =s (1) > 0.
4. Optimal Taxation in the Decentralized Economy
If consumption spillovers create distortions in the decentralized economy, then
a welfare maximizing government would induce the private sector to reach the
social optimum by designing an optimal tax policy. We now introduce a tax on
consumption, a tax on capital, and lump-sum transfers. Under these assumptions,
the ‡ow budget constraint of the representative consumer-producer is
_k = f (k) ¡ (1 + ¿ c) c ¡ ¿kk + T; (33)
where ¿ c, ¿k, and T denote the tax rate on consumption, the tax rate on capital,
and lump-sum transfers, respectively. The representative individual chooses c (t)
in order to maximize overall utility,
R1
0 e
¡rtU (c (t) ; C (t)) dt, subject to (33). A
crucial feature of this optimization problem is that the representative individual
takes not only C (t), but also ¿ c (t), ¿k (t), and T (t) as given when choosing c (t).
The current value Hamiltonian of this optimization problem is given by H =
U (c;C) + ¸ [f (k) ¡ (1 + ¿ c) c ¡ ¿kk + T ]. The necessary optimality conditions,
Hc = 0 and _¸ = r¸ ¡ Hk, become
Uc (c;C) ¡ ¸ ¢ (1 + ¿ c) = 0; (34)
_¸ = ¡¸ ¢ £f 0 (k) ¡ ¿k ¡ r¤ : (35)
The transversality condition is given, as before, by (10). If (c(t); k(t)) satis…es (33),
(34), (35), (10), and the initial condition k (0) = k0, then it is an optimal path.
In the following we restrict attention to a symmetric macroeconomic equilibrium
in which tax revenues are fully rebated.11 In such a situation we have c = C
11The proofs of the following results are given in the appendix, subsection C.
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and ¿ cc + ¿kk = T . Under these conditions, the dynamic evolution of c and k is
governed by the capital accumulation equation, _k = f (k)¡c, and the tax-adjusted
Euler equation for consumption
_c
c
= ¾ed (c)
·
f 0 (k) ¡ r ¡
µ
¿k +
_¿ c
1 + ¿ c
¶¸
(36)
with the transversality condition now equal to
lim
t!1
½
k (t) ¢ exp
·
¡
Z t
0
£
f 0 (k (v)) ¡ ¿k (v)
¤
dv
¸¾
= 0 (37)
Note that if the consumption tax rate ¿ c is constant over time, then the time paths
of c (t) and k (t) are independent of ¿ c. Such a tax policy only in‡uences the level
of the shadow price of capital, ¸ (t), but leaves its rate of change, _¸ (t) =¸ (t),
una¤ected. Loosely speaking, the reason for this ine¤ectiveness result is that a
constant tax rate does not a¤ect the price of future consumption in terms of
present consumption.12 The crucial question of this section is whether the social
optimum can be attained in a decentralized economy by optimally choosing the
time paths of the tax rates ¿k (t) and ¿ c (t). In the following, it will be convenient
to denote the decentralized solution and the socially optimal solution of (c; k)
by (kd; cd) and (ks; cs), respectively. Proposition 6 gives necessary and su¢cient
conditions for optimal capital and consumption taxation.
Proposition 6. (Optimal tax policy): Assume that the socially planned so-
lution (ks (t) ; cs (t)) exists.
(a) (Necessary conditions): If there exist time paths of ¿k (t) and ¿ c (t) such
that the decentralized solution (kd (t) ; cd (t)) is identical with the socially
planned solution (ks (t) ; cs (t)), then
¿k (t) +
_¿ c (t)
1 + ¿ c (t)
=
"
¾ed (cs (t)) ¡ ¾es (cs (t))
¾ed (cs (t))
# £
f 0 (ks (t)) ¡ r¤ : (38)
(b) (Su¢cient conditions): If the time paths of ¿k (t) and ¿ c (t) satisfy (38) and
the time paths of ¿k (t) and ks (t) satisfy the tax-adjusted transversality
condition of the decentralized economy (37), then decentralized solution
exists and (kd (t) ; cd (t)) = (ks (t) ; cs (t)).
12 In the endogenous employment case, Hof (1999b) has shown that a constant consumption
tax does in‡uence the economy’s equilibrium dynamics and can be used as an optimal policy
tool.
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For the proof see the appendix, subsection D. The qualitative implications of the
optimal tax policy (38) can be interpreted as follows. If ¾ed < ¾es, then the e¤ec-
tive preference for smoothing consumption over time is too strong. Consequently,
too much consumption is shifted from the future to the present. This misallo-
cation can be avoided either by subsidizing capital or by taxing consumption so
that the tax rate falls over time (i.e., _¿ c < 0). Both policy measures lower the
price of future consumption in terms of present consumption. On the other hand,
if ¾ed > ¾es, then the e¤ective willingness to postpone consumption is too high.
Consequently, too much consumption is shifted from the present to the future. In
this situation a welfare maximizing government must raise the price of future con-
sumption in terms of present consumption, either through the taxation of capital
or through the taxation of consumption where the tax rate increases over time.
We can next illustrate proposition 6 by two examples.
We consider …rst the case in which V (c; z) is given by (1), the production function
is of the AK -type, f (k) = ak, and the condition a ¡ (a=¯) < r < a holds.
Rauscher’s speci…cation implies that
¾es (c) = ¯; ¾ed (c) =
"
c1¡1=¯ + s0 (1)
c1¡1=¯ + ¯s0 (1)
#
¾es (c) : (39)
The socially planned solution is given by cs (t) = [¯r + a (1 ¡ ¯)] k0e¯(a¡r)t and
ks (t) = k0e¯(a¡r)t. The assumption that a ¡ (a=¯) < r ensures that (cs; ks)
satis…es the transversality condition for the socially planned economy, while the
assumption that r < a ensures that the growth rates of per capita consumption
and per capita capital are positive. The necessary condition for optimal taxation
(38) then becomes
¿k (t) +
_¿ c (t)
1 + ¿ c (t)
=
(1 ¡ ¯) s0 (1) (a ¡ r)
[(¯r + a (1 ¡ ¯)) k0](¯¡1)=¯ e¡(1¡¯)(a¡r)t + s0 (1)
: (40)
We will now consider the case in which the government only imposes a capital
tax, so that ¿ c = 0. It can be shown that the time paths of ¿k (t) and ks (t)
satisfy the transversality condition of the decentralized economy.13 Hence, from
part b of proposition 6, it follows that the social optimum can be attained in the
decentralized economy by setting ¿ c (t) = 0 and choosing ¿k (t) according to (40).
This optimal capital tax has the following properties:
sgn (¿k) = sgn (1 ¡ ¯) ; _¿k (t) > 0;
13A proof is available from the authors on request.
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lim
t!1 ¿k (t) =
(
(1 ¡ ¯) (a ¡ r) > 0 if ¯ < 1;
0 if ¯ > 1:
If ¯ < 1, then capital should be taxed, where the optimal tax rate increases over
time and converges to a …nite level. If, on the other hand, ¯ > 1, then capital
should be subsidized, where the optimal rate of subsidy declines over time and
converges to zero. What is the economic interpretation of this optimal tax policy?
From (39) follows that if ¯ < 1, then
¾ed (c) > ¯ = ¾es (c) ;
@¾ed (c)
@c
> 0; lim
c!1¾
ed (c) = 1
Since ¾ed (c) > ¾es (c), the e¤ective willingness to postpone consumption is too
high. In the absence of any government intervention we have
cd (0) < cs (0) ;
_cd (t)
cd (t)
= ¾ed
³
cd (t)
´
(a ¡ r) > ¯ (a ¡ r) = _c
s (t)
cs (t)
> 0:
In other words, in the decentralized economy the initial level of consumption
is too low compared to the socially optimal level, while the rate of growth in
per capita consumption is too high. Moreover, the di¤erence between the growth
rates increases over time and converges to (1 ¡ ¯) (a ¡ r) > 0 as t ! 1. Hence,
in order to attain the social optimum, capital has to be taxed, where the tax rate
is rising over time and converging to a …nite level.
On the other hand, if ¯ > 1, then
¾ed (c) < ¯ = ¾es (c) ;
@¾ed (c)
@c
> 0; lim
c!1¾
ed (c) = ¯:
Since ¾ed < ¾es, the e¤ective preference for smoothing consumption over time is
too strong. If ¿k = 0, then
cd (0) > cs (0) ; 0 <
_cd (t)
cd (t)
= ¾ed
³
cd (t)
´
(a ¡ r) < ¯ (a ¡ r) = _c
s (t)
cs (t)
:
In this case the initial level of consumption is too high in the decentralized econ-
omy, while the rate of growth in per capita consumption is too low at any time
t. However, the di¤erence between the growth rates decreases over time (in ab-
solute value) and converges to zero as t ! 1. Hence, in order to attain the social
optimum capital has to be subsidized, although the rate of subsidy declines over
time and converges to zero in the limit.
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For the sake of completeness, we also consider the case in which the government
imposes a tax only on consumption. The expression for optimal taxation, (40),
and the condition 1 + ¿ c (t) > 0 are satis…ed if and only if
¿ c (t) = B ¢
n
[(¯r + a (1 ¡ ¯)) k0](¯¡1)=¯ + s0 (1) e(1¡¯)(a¡r)t
o
¡ 1;
where B is an arbitrary positive constant, which implies that the optimal time
path of the consumption tax rate is not uniquely determined. If ¯ > 1, then
_¿ c (t) < 0 and limt!1 ¿ c (t) < 1. On the other hand, if ¯ < 1, then _¿ c (t) > 0
and ¿ c (t) ! 1 as t ! 1, (in contrast to the optimal capital tax rate which
converges to a …nite value).
Finally, consider the case in which V (c; z) takes the form
V (c; z) =
1
1 ¡ µ
h
(c + ±z)1¡µ ¡ 1
i
, µ > 0; ± > 0;
the production function is of the AK-type, f (k) = ak, and a ¡ aµ < r < a holds.
This speci…cation of the utility function implies that
¾es (c) =
c + ±
µc
; ¾ed (c) =
µc
µc + ±
¾es (c) < ¾es (c) :
From (38), it is obvious that capital has to be subsidized, since with these pref-
erences the e¤ective decentralized elasticity of substitution is always less than its
socially optimal counterpart.14 For this reason, the sign of the optimal capital
tax rate – unlike in the previous example – does not depend on the parameters
of the instantaneous utility function.
5. Concluding Remarks
Rauscher introduced conspicuous consumption into an otherwise standard Ram-
sey model with exogenous labor supply in order to study the e¤ects of the quest
for status – as measured by relative consumption – on economic growth and op-
timal tax policy. In this paper we generalized Rauscher’s results by using general
speci…cations of the instantaneous utility function that encompass the functional
forms employed by him and other recent authors. The key concept we used in this
paper is that of the “e¤ective” intertemporal elasticity of substitution. It enabled
us to give conditions for the observational equivalence between economies with
14The explicit solutions for ks (t), cs (t), and ¿k (t) in this case are given in Hof (1999a).
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consumption externalities that arise from status-seeking behavior and externality-
free economies. Using this concept, we also showed that there exist several types
of the instantaneous utility function in which the decentralized solution coincides
with the socially planned one in spite of the presence of consumption externalities.
Under these types of preferences, decentralized economies populated by status-
seeking agents may grow faster or more slowly, but they will never grow too fast
or too slowly compared to the social optimum. Dealing with the issue of optimal
taxation, we considered both a capital tax and a consumption tax. We showed,
with respect to the issue of optimal capital taxation, that whether capital should
be optimally taxed or subsidized depends on whether the e¤ective intertemporal
elasticity of substitution is larger or smaller than its socially optimal counterpart.
Appendix
A. Proof of Proposition 1 – Part b
Using (11) and (13), the condition that ¾ (c) = ¾ed (c) can be written as
¡ u
0 (c)
cu00 (c)
= ¡ Uc (c; c)
c [Ucc (c; c) + UcC (c; c)]
:
Using the de…nitions ' (c) ´ lnu0 (c) and Á (c) ´ lnUc (c; c), this condition can be
rewritten as '0 (c) = Á0 (c). Integration with respect to c yields ' (c) = Á (c) + ·
where · is an arbitrary constant. Substituting the de…nitions of Á and ' we obtain
lnu0 (c) = lnUc (c; c) + · which is equivalent to u0 (c) = ÂUc (c; c), where Â ´ e·
is an arbitrary positive constant. Hence, ¾ (c) = ¾ed (c) is equivalent to (18).
In the relative consumption case in which U takes the form U (c; C) = V (c; c=C),
we have Uc (c; C) = Vc (c; c=C) + C¡1Vz (c; c=C) and Uc (c; c) = Vc (c; 1) +
c¡1Vz (c; 1). Substituting the latter expression into (18) we obtain (19).
B. Proof of Proposition 4 – Part b and part c
Proof of (b): From (14) and (29) follows that ¾ed (c) = ¾es (c) holds if and only if
¡ Uc (c; c)
c [Ucc (c; c) + UcC (c; c)]
= ¡ Uc (c; c) + UC (c; c)
c [Ucc (c; c) + 2UcC (c; c) + UCC (c; c)]
:
It is easily veri…ed that this condition is equivalent to
UCc (c; c) + UCC (c; c)
UC (c; c)
=
Ucc (c; c) + UcC (c; c)
Uc (c; c)
:
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Using the de…nitions Á (c) ´ jUC (c; c)j and ' (c) ´ Uc (c; c), this condition can be
rewritten as Á0 (c) =Á (c) = '0 (c) =' (c). Taking into account that Á (c) > 0 and
' (c) > 0, the latter condition can be rewritten as d [lnÁ (c)] =dc = d [ln' (c)] =dc:
Integration with respect to c yields lnÁ (c) = ln' (c) + · = ln (±' (c)), with ± ´
e· > 0, where · is an arbitrary constant implying that ± is an arbitrary positive
constant. Obviously, the latter condition is equivalent to Á (c) = ±' (c), which
can be rewritten as jUC (c; c)j =Uc (c; c) = ±. Clearly, this condition is identical to
(31).
Next, we show that if there are negative consumption externalities, (i.e., UC < 0),
then ± < 1. If UC (c; c) < 0, then condition (3) can be written as Uc (c; c) ¡
jUC (c; c)j > 0, which implies that ± = jUC (c; c)j =Uc (c; c) < 1.
Proof of (c): In the relative consumption case in which U takes the form
U (c;C) = V (c; c=C), we have Uc (c; c) = Vc (c; 1) + c¡1Vz (c; 1) and UC (c; c) =
¡c¡1Vz (c; 1) < 0. Substituting these expressions into the general condition for
social optimality given by (31) we obtain
jUC (c; c)j
Uc (c; c)
=
c¡1Vz (c; 1)
Vc (c; 1) + c¡1Vz (c; 1)
= ±;
where ± is an arbitrary positive constant with ± < 1 (due to the fact that there
are negative consumption externalities, i.e., UC < 0). Rearranging, we obtain
Vz (c; 1) = [cVc (c; 1)] = ´, where ´ ´ ±= (1 ¡ ±) is an arbitrary positive constant
(due to 0 < ± < 1). Obviously, this condition is identical to (32).
C. Symmetric Equilibria with Government Intervention
In a symmetric macroeconomic equilibrium identical individuals choose identical
consumption levels, implying that c = C holds. By assumption, the government
runs a balanced budget, i.e., ¿ cc + ¿kk = T . Substitution of ¿ cc + ¿kk = T into
the ‡ow budget constraint of the representative consumer-producer (33) yields the
capital accumulation equation _k = f (k)¡c. Substituting c = C into the necessary
optimality condition for consumption (34) we obtain Uc (c; c) = (1 + ¿ c)¸ and
ln¸ = lnUc (c; c)¡ ln (1 + ¿ c). Di¤erentiating the latter condition with respect to
time t we get
_¸
¸
=
[Ucc (c; c) + UcC (c; c)] _c
Uc (c; c)
¡ _¿ c
1 + ¿ c
:
Substituting this result into the second necessary optimality condition (35), re-
arranging and using the de…nition of ¾ed (c) given by (14), we obtain the Euler
equation (36):
_c
c
= ¾ed (c)
·
f 0 (k) ¡ r ¡
µ
¿k +
_¿ c
1 + ¿ c
¶¸
:
21
Finally, we show that the transversality condition is given by (37). Integration of
(35) with respect to time yields
¸ (t) = ert¸ (0) exp
·
¡
Z t
0
£
f 0 (k (v)) ¡ ¿k (v)
¤
dv
¸
;
where ¸ (0) = [1 + ¿ c (0)]
¡1 Uc (c (0) ; c (0)). Substituting these results into the
transversality condition (10), and taking into account that Uc > 0 and 1+ ¿ c > 0
by assumption, it is obvious that the transversality condition can be written as
lim
t!1
½
k (t) ¢ exp
·
¡
Z t
0
£
f 0 (k (v)) ¡ ¿k (v)
¤
dv
¸¾
= 0;
which is identical with (37).
D. Proof of Proposition 6
In the following we assume that the socially planned solution (ks (t) ; cs (t)) exists.
Proof of (a): Assume that there exist time paths of ¿k (t) and ¿ c (t) which ensure
that kd (t) = ks (t) and cd (t) = cs (t). If this is the case, then _kd (t) = _ks (t) and
_cd (t) = _cs (t) also obtains. In the decentralized economy the rate of growth of per
capita consumption is given by [see (36)]
_cd (t)
cd (t)
= ¾ed
³
cd (t)
´ ·
f 0
³
kd (t)
´
¡ r ¡
µ
¿k (t) +
_¿ c (t)
1 + ¿ c (t)
¶¸
: (D1)
Similarly, in the socially planned economy the growth rate of consumption is given
by [see (28)]
_cs (t) =cs (t) = ¾es (cs (t))
£
f 0 (ks (t)) ¡ r¤ : (D2)
Substituting kd (t) = ks (t), cd (t) = cs (t), and _cd (t) = _cs (t) into (D1) we obtain
_cs (t)
cs (t)
= ¾ed (cs (t))
·
f 0 (ks (t)) ¡ r ¡
µ
¿k (t) +
_¿ c (t)
1 + ¿ c (t)
¶¸
: (D3)
From (D2) and (D3) it follows that
¿k (t) +
_¿ c (t)
1 + ¿ c (t)
=
Ã
¾ed (cs (t)) ¡ ¾es (cs (t))
¾ed (cs (t))
! £
f 0 (ks (t)) ¡ r¤ ;
which is identical with (38).
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Proof of (b): Assume that the time paths of ¿k (t) and ¿ c (t) satisfy (38). Substi-
tuting (38) into (36), we obtain
_c
c
= ¾ed (c)
"
f 0 (k) ¡ r ¡
Ã
¾ed (cs (t)) ¡ ¾es (cs (t))
¾ed (cs (t))
! £
f 0 (ks (t)) ¡ r¤# : (D4)
Hence, the decentralized solution (cd; kd) is determined by the di¤erential equa-
tion (D4), the di¤erential equation _k = f (k) ¡ c, the initial condition k (0) = k0,
and the transversality condition (37). In the following we will show that the
socially planned solution (cs; ks) satis…es the same di¤erential equations, the
same initial condition, and the same transversality condition, which implies that
(cd; kd) = (cs; ks).
Obviously, (cs; ks) satis…es the di¤erential equation _k = f (k) ¡ c and the initial
condition k (0) = k0. It also satis…es the transversality condition of the decentral-
ized economy, since in part (b) it is explicitly assumed that the time paths of ¿k (t)
and ks (t) satisfy (37). Since (cs; ks) satis…es the di¤erential equation (28) by def-
inition, we have _cs (t) =cs (t) = ¾es (cs (t)) [f 0 (ks (t)) ¡ r]. Simple transformations
of this expression yield
_cs (t)
cs (t)
= ¾ed (cs (t))
"
f 0 (ks (t)) ¡ r ¡
Ã
¾ed (cs (t)) ¡ ¾es (cs (t))
¾ed (cs (t))
! £
f 0 (ks (t)) ¡ r¤# ;
which shows that (cs; ks) also satis…es the di¤erential equation (D4).
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